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Abstract 
When multiple followers are involved in a bilevel decision problem, the leader’s decision 
will be affected, not only by the reactions of these followers, but also by the relationships 
among these followers. One of the popular situations within this framework is where 
these followers are uncooperatively making decisions while having cross reference of 
decision information. This situation is called a referential-uncooperative situation in this 
paper. The well-known Kuhn-Tucker approach has been successfully applied to a one-
leader-and-one-follower linear bilevel decision problem. This paper extends this 
approach to deal with the above-mentioned linear referential-uncooperative bilevel multi-
follower decision problem. The paper first presents a decision model for this problem. It 
then proposes an extended Kuhn-Tucker approach to solve this problem. Finally, a 
numeric example illustrates the application of the proposed Kuhn-Tucker approach.  
  




In a bilevel programming (BLP) problem, the leader cannot completely control his/her 
follower but is influenced by the reaction of his/her follower. Such a situation is 
appearing in decision making of many decentralized organizations. BLP was motivated 
by the game theory of Von Stackelberg [1] in the context of unbalanced economic 
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markets [2]. The majority of research on BLP has centered on the linear version of the 
problem in which only one follower is involved. There have been nearly two dozen 
algorithms, such as, the K
th
 best approach [3, 4], Kuhn-Tucker approach [5-7], 
complementarity pivot approach [8], penalty function approach [9-13], proposed for 
solving linear BLP problems since the field being caught the attention of researchers in 
the mid-1970s. Kuhn-Tucker approach has been proven to be a valuable analysis tool 
with a wide range of successful applications for linear BLP [2, 6, 7, 14-16].  
Although much research has been carried out in the area, the existing bilevel technology 
has mainly limited to a specific situation comparing one leader and one follower. 
However, in a real-world bilevel decision problem, the lower level of a bilevel decision 
may involve multiple decision units. For example, the dean of a faculty is the leader, and 
all the heads of departments in the faculty are the followers in making a faculty annual 
budget. The leader (the dean, for example)’s decision will be affected, not only by the 
reactions of the multiple followers (these heads of departments in the faculty), but also by 
the relationships among these followers.  Each of the leader's possible decisions is 
influenced by the various reactions of his/her followers who may have had a share in 
decision information, objectives and constraints. Hence, a bilevel multi-follower (BLMF) 
decision problem is a common case in any organizational decision practice, and involves 
various different decision situations. 
Our previous work [17-20] presented overcame some fundamental deficiency of existing 
linear BLP theory. Based on that, we have recently generalized a framework for BLMF 
decision problems, and identified nine main kinds of relationships amongst these 
followers [21]. The uncooperative model is the most popular situation for BLMF decision 
problems. This model handles the case in which there is no shared decision variable 
among the followers. Under this uncooperative model, the most basic situation is that any 
follower also doesn’t make any reference to other followers’ decision.  For a model and 
related approaches in finding an optimal solution for this particular decision situation, the 
reader is referred to [21-23]. Another such uncooperative situation is that though these 
followers are uncooperative (no sharing of decision variables) but have cross reference of 
information by considering other followers’ decision results in each of their own decision 
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objective and constraint. We call this case as a referential-uncooperative situation, and 
this paper will particularly focus on this situation. 
 
Following the introduction, this paper proposes a model for linear BLMF decision 
making in a referential-uncooperative situation in Section 2. An extended Kuhn-Tucker 
approach for solving this model is presented in Section 3. A numeric example for this 
approach is illustrated in Section 4. Further remarks are concluded in Section 5.  
 
2. The linear BLMF decision model in a referential-uncooperative situation 
Under the BLMF framework, if two followers don’t have any shared decision variable, it 
is called an uncooperative relationship. But if one of them has a reference of another 
follower’s decision information in his/her objective or constraint, the two followers are 
defined having a referential-uncooperative relationship. When there is a referential-
uncooperative relationship in a BLMF model, this model is called a referential-
uncooperative BLMF model. We present this model as follows.   
For nRXx  , imii RYy  , 
1
1: RYYXF K   , and 
1
1: RYYXf Ki   , 
Ki ,,2,1  , a linear BLMF decision problem where )2(K  followers are involved and 
there are not shared decision variables, but shared information in objective functions and 
constraint functions among the followers is defined as follows:  










1 ),,,(min   (1 a) 





 (1 b) 










1 ),,,(min   (1 c) 





,                                          (1 d) 
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where nRc , ni Rc  , 
im
i Rd  , 
sm
is Re  , 
pRb , iqi Rb  , 





 , si mqis RC
 , Ksi ,,2,1,  . 
Definition 1 A compact set is compact if every open cover of the entire space has a finite 
subcover. For example, ],[ ba  is compact in R  (the Heine-Borel theorem) [24]. 
Corresponding to (1), we give following basic definition. 
Definition 2 

















The constraint region refers to all possible combinations of choices that the leader 
and followers may make. 












(c) Feasible set for each follower )(XSx : 
  }),,,(:{)( 1 SyyxYyxS Kiii   . 
 The feasible region for each follower is affected by the leader’s choice of x , and  
  the allowable choices of each follower are the elements of S .  
(d) Each follower’s rational reaction set for )(XSx : 
)]}(ˆ:),,,2,1,,ˆ,(min[arg:{)( xSyijKjyyxfyYyxP iijiiiiii   ,  
where Ki ,,2,1  ,  )](ˆ:),,,2,1,,ˆ,(min[arg xSyijKjyyxf iijii   
)}(ˆ),,,,2,1,,ˆ,(),,,(:)({ 1 xSyijKjyyxfyyxfxSy iijiiKiii   . The 
followers observe the leader’s action and simultaneously react by selecting iy  
from their feasible set to minimize their objective functions. 
(e) Inducible region: 
},,2,1),(,),,,(:),,,{( 11 KixPySyyxyyxIR iiKK   .  
 Thus in terms of the above notations, (1) can be written as 
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                         }),,,(:),,,(min{ 11 IRyyxyyxF KK   (2) 
We propose the following theorem to characterize the condition under which there is 
an optimal solution for (1). 
Theorem 1 If S  is nonempty and compact, there exists an optimal solution for a linear 
BLMFP problem. 
Proof: Since S  is nonempty, there exist a point Syyx K ),,,(
**
1
*  . Then, we have 
  )(* XSx , 
by Definition 2(b). Consequently, we have 
 )( *xSi , Ki ,,2,1  , 
by Definition 2(c). Because S is compact and Definition 2(d), we have 
)]}(ˆ:),,,2,1,,ˆ,(min[arg:{)( *** xSyijKjyyxfyYyxP iijiiiiii    
:)({:{ *xSyyYy iiiii   
 )}}(ˆ),,,,2,1,,ˆ,(),,,( **1
* xSyijKjyyxfyyxf iijiiKi  , 




*  .  Therefore, we have 
  },,2,1),(,),,,(:),,,{( 11 KixPySyyxyyxIR iiKK  , 











1 ),,,(min  over IR , which is nonempty and bounded, an optimal 
solution to the linear BLMFP problem must exist. So the proof is completed.  
 
3 An extended Kuhn-Tucker approach  
Let write a linear programming (LP) as follows. 
 cxxf )(min        
 subject to bAx         
      0x ,       
where c  is an n-dimensional row vector, b  an m-dimensional column vector, A  an 
nm  matrix with nm  , and nRx . 
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Let mR  and nR  be the dual variables associated with constraints bAx   and 
0x , respectively. Bard [2] gave the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1 A necessary and sufficient condition that )( *x  solves above LP is that 
there exist (row) vectors * , *  such that ),,( *** x  solves: 
 cA           
 0bAx          
 0)( bAx          
 0x          
 0,0,0  x .       
Proof: (See reference [2] PP. 59-60) 
 
Let pi Ru  , 
Kqqq
i Rv















 and 0iy  ),,1( Ki  , 
respectively, where TKAAAA ),,,( 21
'  , TiKiii CCCC ),,,( 21
'  , TKbbbb ),,,( 21
'  . 
We have a following theorem. 
Theorem 2 A necessary and sufficient condition that ),,,( **1
*
Kyyx   solves the linear 
BLMFP problem (1) is that there exist (row) vectors **2
*


















KKKK wwvvuuyyx   solves: 










1 ),,,(min   (3 a) 













 (3 c) 
iiiiiii ewCvBu 














ssi ywyCxAbvyBAxbu  (3 e) 
Kjwvuyx jjjj ,,2,1,0,0,0,0,0  , (3 f) 
where Ki ,2,1  . 
Proof: 
(1) Let us get an explicit expression of (2). 
Rewrite (2) as follows: 
 ),,,(min 1 KyyxF   
 subject to IRyyx K ),,,( 1  . 
We have 
 ),,,(min 1 KyyxF   
 subject to Syyx K ),,,( 1   
       )(xPy ii  , 
 where Ki ,,2,1  , by Definition  2(e). Then, we have 
 ),,,(min 1 KyyxF   
 subject to Syyx K ),,,( 1   
                 )](ˆ:),,,2,1,,ˆ,(min[arg xSyijKjyyxfy iijiii   , 
 where Ki ,,2,1  , by Definition  2(d). We rewrite it as: 
 ),,,(min 1 KyyxF   
 subject to Syyx K ),,,( 1   
                  ),,,(min 1 Ki yyxf   
                  subject to )(xSy ii  , 
where Ki ,,2,1  . We have 
 ),,,(min 1 KyyxF   
 subject to Syyx K ),,,( 1   







                  subject to Syyx K ),,,( 1  , 
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where Ki ,,2,1  , by Definition  2(c). Consequently, we can have 










1 ),,,(min   (4 a) 





 (4 b) 





, Kj ,,2,1   (4 c) 










),,,(min   (4 d) 





  (4 e) 





, Kj ,,2,1  , (4 f) 
where Ki ,,2,1  , by Definition  2(a). 
This simple transformation has shown that solving the linear BLMFP (1) is 
equivalent to solving (4a-f). 
(2) Necessity is obvious from (4a-f). 
(3) Sufficiency. 
If  ),,,( **1
*
Kyyx   is the optimal solution of (1a-d), we need to show that there exist (row) 
vectors **2
*














KK uuyyx   
),,,,, **1
**
1 KK wwvv   to solve (4a-f). Going one step farther, we only need to proof that 
there exist (row) vectors **2
*

















KKKK wwvvuuyyx   satisfies the follows 
iiiiiii ewCvBu 














ssi yCxAbv  (5 c) 
0ii yw  (5 d) 
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where pi Ru  , 
Kqqq
i Rv
 21 , imi Rw  , Ki ,,2,1   and they are not negative 
variables. Because ),,,( **1
*
Kyyx   is the optimal solution of (1a-d), we have 
 IRyyx K ),,,(
**
1
*  , 
by (2). Thus we have 
 )( ** xPy ii  , 
where Ki ,,2,1  , by Definition  2(e). Consequently, 
),,,( **2
*
1 Kyyy   is the optimal solution to the following problem 
 ))(:),,,(min( *1
* xSyyyxf iiKi  ,             
where Ki ,,2,1  , by Definition  2(d). Rewrite it as follows 
 ),,,(min 1 Ki yyxf   
 subject to )(xSy ii   
       *xx    
       
*
jj yy  , ijKj  ,,,2,1  , 








1 ),,,(min   (6 a) 











, Kj ,,2,1   (6 c) 
*xx   (6 d) 
0iy  (6 e) 
ijKjyy jj  ,,,2,1,
*  , (6 f) 
where Ki ,,2,1  . Let us define: 
1
21
' ),,,(  KAAAA  , 
1
21
' ),,,(  Kbbbb  , 
1
21
' ),,,(  iKiii CCCC  , Ki ,2,1  . To 















                                   







                             
      *xx                                                 
                             0iy ,                         
       ijKjyy jj  ,,,2,1,
*  ,           
where Ki ,,2,1  . Thus simplify it, we can have 
iiiii yeyf )(min  (7 a) 

















































  (7 b) 
0iy  (7 c) 
where Ki ,,2,1  . 
Now we see that *iy  is the optimal solution of (7) which is a LP problem. By 





































































                     




 1 ,  imi R , Ki ,,2,1  . 
Let pi Ru  , 
Ki qqq
i Rv
 2 , imi Rw   and define  
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 iii vu ,  
iiw  , 








KKKK wwvvuuyyx  that 
satisfy (8a-n). Our proof is completed.      
Theorem 2 means that the most direct approach to solving (1a-d) is to solve the 
equivalent mathematical program given in (7a-c). One advantage that it offers is that it 
allows for a more robust model to be solved without introducing any new computational 
difficulties. 
4. A numeric example 
Example 1 
Consider a following linear BLMF problem with 121, Rxx  , 
1
21, Ryy  , 
1Rz and 
}0,0{ 21  xxX , }0,0,0{ 321  yyyY ,  









  subject to 15.022 3211  yyyx   





















         subject to 15.022 3212  yyyx        
                   1321  yyy . 
Let us give Example 1 to show how the Kuhn-Tucker approach works. According to our 
approach, let us write all the inequalities but 0,0,0 321  yxx  of the transferred form 
of Example 1 as follows: 
0)5.022(1),,,,( 3211321211,  yyyxyyyxxgu  
0)5.022(1),,,,( 3212321211,  yyyxyyyxxgv  
0)(1),,,,( 321321212,  yyyyyyxxgv  
 12 
 0),,,,( 1321211,1  yyyyxxgw  
0),,,,( 2321211,2  yyyyxxgw  
0),,,,( 3321211,3  yyyyxxgw . 
From (3a-f), we have 
)440448min( 32121 yyyxx   (8 a) 
subject to 15.022 3211  yyyx  (8 b) 
15.022 3212  yyyx  (8 c) 
1321  yyy  (8 d) 
22 11121111  wvvu  (8 e) 
22 21222121  wvvu  (8 f) 
25.05.0 31323131  wvvu  (8 g) 
0111,1122,111,111,  wgvgvgug wvvu  (8 h) 
0211,2222,211,211,  wgvgvgug wvvu  (8 i) 
0311,3322,311,311,  wgvgvgug wvvu  (8 j) 
0,0,0,0,0 32121  yyyxx  (8 k) 
0,0,0,0 11121111  wvvu  (8 l) 
0,0,0,0 21222121  wvvu  (8 m) 
0,0,0,0 31323131  wvvu . (8 n) 
 
From (8e), (8f), (8g), (8l), (8m) and (8n), we can have following six possibilities. 
Case 1: )0,2,0,0,0,0,2,0,0,0,0,2(),,,,,,,,,,,( 313231312122212111121111 wvvuwvvuwvvu  
Case 2: )0,2,0,0,0,0,2,0,0,2,0,0(),,,,,,,,,,,( 313231312122212111121111 wvvuwvvuwvvu  
Case 3: )0,2,0,0,0,0,2,0,2,0,0,0(),,,,,,,,,,,( 313231312122212111121111 wvvuwvvuwvvu  
Case 4: )0,2,0,0,2,0,0,0,0,0,0,2(),,,,,,,,,,,( 313231312122212111121111 wvvuwvvuwvvu  
Case 5: )0,2,0,0,2,0,0,0,0,2,0,0(),,,,,,,,,,,( 313231312122212111121111 wvvuwvvuwvvu  
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Case 6: )0,2,0,0,2,0,0,0,2,0,0,0(),,,,,,,,,,,( 313231312122212111121111 wvvuwvvuwvvu  
From Case1, (8h), (8i), (8j) and (8k), we have 
0)5.022(1),,,,( 3211321211,  yyyxyyyxxgu  
0)5.022(1),,,,( 3212321211,  yyyxyyyxxgv  
0)(1),,,,( 321321212,  yyyyyyxxgv . 
Consequently, (8) can be rewritten as follows: 
 )440448min( 32121 yyyxx        
 subject to 15.022 3211  yyyx           
      15.022 3212  yyyx  
       1321  yyy       
       0,0,0,0,0 2121  zyyxx . 









1 yyyxx  with 8
1 F , 311 f , 5.1
1
2 f  and 5.1
1
3 f  









1 yyyxx  with 8
2 F , 321 f , 5.1
2
2 f  and 5.1
2
3 f  for 








1 yyyxx  with 5
3 F , 
25.131 f , 25.1
3
2 f  and 5.2
3









1 yyyxx  with 8
4 F , 341 f , 5.1
4
2 f  and 5.1
4
3 f  for 








1 yyyxx  with 8
5 F , 
351 f , 5.1
5
2 f  and 5.1
5









1 yyyxx  with 5
6 F , 25.161 f , 25.1
6
2 f  and 
5.263 f   for Case 6. 







1 zyyxx  with 8
* F , 3*1 f , 5.1
*
2 f , 5.1
*
3 f for this 
Example 1.  
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5. Further remark 
Different relationships among followers in a BLMF decision problem could cause 
multiple different processes for deriving an optimal solution for the upper level’s decision 
making. The referential-uncooperative situation is one of the popular cases in BLMF 
decision practices. For solving such a BLMF decision problem, this paper extended the 
Kuhn-Tucker approach from dealing with one leader and one follower to dealing with 
referential-uncooperative multiple followers. This paper further illustrated the details of 
the proposed approach by a numeric example. Initial experiment results showed this new 
extended approach more effectively for solving the proposed BLMF decision problem. 
Like most really powerful ideas, the basic notion of Nash equilibrium is very simple, 
even obvious. Its mathematical extensions and implications are not, however. The idea of 
this natural "sticking point" is that no single player can benefit from unilaterally changing 
his or her move - a non-cooperative best-response equilibrium [25]. As a future research, 
we are going to explore how use this concept into our BLMF research. Some practical 
use of this extended algorithm also will be considered as our future research task for 
BLMF decision making in the referential-uncooperative situation.  
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